This chapter sketches the three generic types of twentieth-century philosophy of science in terms of the four functional topics mentioned above. Philosophy of language will be taken up in Chapter III. Then all these elements will be integrated together to complete the synthesis in Chapter IV.


2.01 Romanticism

Romanticism has no representation in the natural sciences today, but is still widely represented in the social sciences including economics and sociology. It originated with the eighteenth-century German idealist philosophers including notably Immanuel Kant. The idealist philosophies are of purely antiquarian interest to professional philosophers of science today, but contemporary romantics carry forward the thesis that there is a fundamental divide between sciences of nature and sciences of culture. Romantics default to the positivist philosophy for the natural sciences, but they reject imitating the positivist philosophy of the natural sciences for the social sciences.

Aim of science:

For romantics the aim of the social sciences is “interpretative understanding” of “human action”, by which is meant explanation of social interaction in terms of the culturally shared subjective mental states – ideas and motives – of members of social groups.

Discovery:

Because romantics define “theory” as language describing subjective ideas and motivations, some of them furthermore view the development of theory in the social sciences as involving the social scientist’s introspective reflection on his own experienced ideas and motivations. They thus attempt to understand by imputation the subjective mental states of the social members whose social interactions they seek to explain. Some social scientists call such attempts to relive vicariously the experiences of the social members “substantive reasoning”.

The romantics therefore deny that social theory understood as interpretative understanding can be developed by data analysis exclusively or by observation of external behavior alone. Romantics oppose their view of the aim of science to the positivists’ view including notably that of the behaviorists such as B.F. Skinner. The former say they explain consciously purposeful and motivated “human action”, while the latter say they explain publicly observable “human behavior”.

Criticism:

The romantic criterion for criticism is “interpretative understanding” of conscious motivations, which are deemed to be the underlying causes of observed human action. Causality is an ontological concept, and all romantics impose their mentalistic ontology as a prior ontological criterion for criticism, while making empirical or statistical analyses at most optional and supplementary.

Furthermore many romantic social scientists demand the criterion that a social theory “make sense” in the particular investigator’s own introspectively recognized subjective personal experience.

Explanation:

The romantics maintain that only “theory” that describes subjective motives can “explain” conscious human action. The motives are the causal factors identified in “causal” explanations, which are also therefore called “theoretical” explanations. Observed regularities cannot “explain”, even if they enable correct predictions.


2.02 Positivism

Positivism was a reaction against romanticism, but more recently it has been relegated to history of philosophy. Positivists hark back to the eighteenth-century British empiricist philosophers including notably David Hume. But it was not until the late nineteenth century that positivism got its name from the French philosopher Auguste Comte, who also founded sociology.

Positivism’s last incarnation was the “neopositivists”, who attempted to use the symbolic logic developed by Russell and Whitehead early in the twentieth century. They had fantasized that the Russellian truth-functional symbolic logic could serve philosophy, as mathematics has served physics, and they called themselves “logical positivists”.

Contrary to the romantics, positivists believe that all sciences including social sciences share the same philosophy of science. And the positivist ideas about science are based upon their examination of the physical sciences.

Aim of science:

Positivists believed that the aim of science is to produce explanations that have a foundation in objectivity supplied by observation. This is called a “foundationalist agenda.” Early positivists recognized only empirical laws for valid scientific explanations, but later positivists also recognized hypothetical theories in valid scientific explanations, if the theories could be logically related to language used to report observations.

Discovery:

Positivists define empirical laws as universally quantified statements containing only observation terms describing observable entities and phenomena. They believed that empirical laws are inferentially produced by inductive generalization based on repeated observations.

In contrast positivists define theories as statements containing theoretical terms, which do not describe observable entities or phenomena. They believed that theories are the products of creative imagination, but left the creative process for developing theories unexplained.

Criticism:

The positivists’ criterion for criticism is publicly accessible observation. They deny that either empirical laws or theories can be permanently validated empirically, but they require that the laws be founded in observation as a condition for the objectivity needed for true science. They maintain that observation language is incorrigible and not subject to revision.

Theories on the other hand are subject to revision, but are nevertheless indirectly and tentatively warranted by the empirical laws, when the laws are logically implied by the theories.

Explanation:

Positivists and specifically Carl Hempel advocated the “covering-law” model of explanation, according to which predictions of observable individual events are deductively derived from observation-language statements together with universal or “covering” empirical laws. This form of explanation has also been called the “nomological-deductive” model.

Positivists also maintained that theories explain laws, when the theories are premises from which the empirical laws are deductively derived as theorems by the mediation of “correspondence rules”, which are also called “bridge principles”. Correspondence rules are sentences that relate the theoretical terms in a theory to the observation terms in the empirical laws.


2.03 Contemporary Pragmatism

In the middle of the twentieth century there emerged a new academic philosophy in the United States that has been critical of logical positivism. Now appropriately called “contemporary pragmatism”, it is currently the ascendant philosophy in American academia.

Pragmatism had earlier versions in the classical pragmatists, notably those of Charles S. Pierce, William James and John Dewey. Some theses in classical pragmatism such as the importance of belief have been carried forward into the new. Especially important is John Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy of science, which says that the logical distinctions and methods of scientific inquiry develop out of the scientist’s successful problem-solving processes.

The origin of the contemporary pragmatist philosophy of science is Werner Heisenberg’s reflections on the language in his quantum-theory revolution in microphysics. There have been various alternative ontologies proposed for the quantum theory in modern microphysics. Most physicists have accepted one that has ambiguously been called the “Copenhagen interpretation”. There are two versions of the Copenhagen interpretation, and both assert a thesis called “duality”, which says that the wave and particle properties of the electron are two aspects of the same entity, rather than two separate entities always found together.

One of those versions is called “complementarity”, which was proposed by Niels Bohr, founder of the Copenhagen Institute for Physics. His version says that the mathematical equations of quantum theory must be viewed instrumentally instead of descriptively, because only the language of classical Newtonian physics can describe physical reality. Instrumentalism is the doctrine that scientific theories are not descriptions of reality, but are merely useful instruments that enable prediction. The quantum theory says that the electron has both wave and particle properties, but in classical physics the semantics of the terms “wave” and “particle” are mutually exclusive – a wave is spread out in space while a particle is a concentrated point. Therefore Bohr maintained that description of the electron as both “wave” and “particle” is a necessary semantic inconsistency that he called “complementarity”.

Heisenberg, a colleague of Bohr at the Copenhagen Institute, proposed his own version of the Copenhagen interpretation. His version also contains the idea of duality, but he said that the mathematical expression of the quantum theory is realistic and descriptive rather than merely instrumentalist. And since the equations describing both the wave and particle properties of the electron are mathematically consistent, there is in no need for Bohr’s complementarity inconsistency.

The two versions differ in their philosophy of language. Bohr’s philosophy is a naturalistic view of semantics, which requires what he called the “forms of perception”. Heisenberg’s philosophy is the artifactual view of semantics, in which the equations of his uncertainty relations supply the context that defines the concepts that the physicist uses for observation. Heisenberg’s philosophy of language was due to the influence of Albert Einstein, and it has been incorporated into the contemporary pragmatist philosophy of language.

Heisenberg’s linguistic philosophy as incorporated into the contemporary pragmatist philosophy may be summarized in three theses:


Thesis I: Relativized semantics.

In "Quantum Mechanics and a Talk with Einstein (1925-1926)" in his Physics and Beyond Heisenberg relates that on the day in April of 1925, when he presented his matrix-mechanics quantum theory to the prestigious Physics Colloquium at the University of Berlin, Einstein, who was in the assembly, afterward invited him to his home that evening. In their conversation Einstein said that he no longer accepts the positivist view of observation including such positivist ideas as operational definitions, because the theory describes what the physicist can observe.

The idea that theory determines what is observed contradicts the fundamental positivist thesis that there is a dichotomous separation between observation language and theory language. Positivists believed that the objectivity of science requires that the vocabulary used for incorrigible observation must be uncontaminated by the vocabulary of speculative and provisional theory.

Then in the next chapter titled "Fresh Fields (1926-1927)" in the same book Heisenberg reports that Einstein's discussion with him in Berlin had later occasioned his own reconsideration of observation. He then recognized that classical Newtonian physical theory had led him to conceptualize the observed track of the electron in the Wilson cloud chamber as having a definite position and velocity.

Recalling Einstein’s statement that the semantics of observation is determined by physical theory, Heisenberg reconsidered what is observed in the cloud chamber. He then rephrased his question about the electron tracks in the cloud chamber using the concepts of the quantum theory instead of the classical Newtonian theory. He reports that he asked himself: Can the quantum mechanics represent the fact that an electron finds itself approximately in a given place and that it moves approximately at a given velocity? In answer to this newly formulated question he found that these approximations could be represented mathematically. He then developed this mathematical representation that he called the “uncertainty relations”, the historic contribution for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1932.

Later Russell Hanson expressed Einstein’s thesis that the physical theory describes what the physicist can observe by saying that observation is “theory-laden” and Karl Popper likewise by saying that observation is “theory-impregnated”.

Furthermore Paul Feyerabend recognized employment of relativized semantics to create new observation language, and he called that practice “counterinduction”. Feyerabend found that Galileo practiced counterinduction in the Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems (1632), where Galileo reinterpreted apparently falsifying observations in common experience by using the concepts of the heliocentric theory instead of the concepts of the geocentric theory. Likewise Heisenberg practiced counterinduction in 1926 to reinterpret the observed electron track in the Wilson cloud chamber using quantum concepts instead of classical concepts.

Like Einstein, pragmatists say that the theory decides what the scientist can observe. Thus semantics is relativized in the sense that the meanings of descriptive terms used in observation reporting are not just names or labels for phenomena, but rather are determined by the context in which they occur.

Most notably that context includes theories that proponents believe are true. The significance is that the acceptance of a new theory superseding an earlier one and sharing some of the same descriptive terms, produces a semantical change in the shared descriptive terms used for observation reporting. Thus Einstein for example changed the meanings of such terms as “space” and “time”, which occur in both the Newtonian and relativity theories. And Heisenberg changed the meanings of the terms “wave” and “particle”. Feyerabend calls the semantical change due to the relative nature of semantics, “meaning variance”.


Thesis II: Empirical underdetermination.

Einstein recognized that a plurality of alternative empirically adequate theories could be consistent with the same observational description, a situation that in his autobiography he called “an embarrassment of riches”.

Measurement error and conceptual vagueness, which can be reduced indefinitely but never completely eliminated, exemplify the empirical underdetermination that is inherent in all language, and that permits this observational ambiguity and theoretical pluralism. Additional context including law language and/or improved test-design language contributes additional semantics to the observational description in the test designs, thus reducing but not eliminating empirical underdetermination. And such additional semantics for test designs that refines the definition of the problem may occasion retesting of theories previously tested and not falsified. Willard van Quine called this thesis “empirical underdetermination”, the label by which the thesis is known today.
 

Thesis III: Ontological relativity.

In his discussions about Einstein's special theory of rela¬tivity in Physics and Philosophy and in Across the Frontiers Heisenberg describes the "decisive step” in the develop¬ment of special relativity. That step was Einstein's rejection of Hendrik Lor¬entz's distinction between "apparent time" and "actual time" in the Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction. Lorentz took the Newtonian concepts to describe real space and time. In his relativity theory Einstein took Lorentz’s "apparent time" as physically real time, while altogether rejecting the Newtonian concept of absolute time as real time. In other words the “decisive step” consisted of Einstein’s taking the relativity theory realistically, and letting his relativity theory define the ontology of the physi¬cally real.

Then in his "History of Quan¬tum Theory" in Physics and Philosophy Heisenberg describes his use of the same strategy in his discovery experience for quantum theory. There he states that his thinking about the uncertainty relations consisted of turning around a question. Instead of asking himself how one can express in the Newtonian mathematical scheme a given experimental situation, he asked whether only such experimental situations can arise in nature as can be described in the formalism of his quantum theory. The new question is an ontological question about what exists in physical reality.

Again in "Remarks on the Origin of the Relations of Uncertainty” in The Uncertainty Principle and Foundations of Quantum Mechanics Heisenberg explicitly states that a Newtonian path of the electron in the cloud cham¬ber does not exist. And still again in "The Development of the Interpretation of the Quantum Theory" in Pauli's Niels Bohr and the Development of Physics, Heisenberg says that he inverted the question of how to pass from an experimentally given situation to its mathematical representation. There he concludes that only those states that can be represented as vectors in Hilbert space can exist in nature and be realized experimentally. And he immediately adds that this conclusion has its prototype in Einstein's special theory of relativity, when Einstein had removed the difficulties of electrodynamics by saying that the apparent time of the Lorentz transformation is real time.

Like Heisenberg in 1926, the contemporary pragmatist philosophers let the scientist rather than the philosopher decide ontological questions. And the scientist does so on the basis of empirical adequacy demonstrated in empirical tests. Many years later Quine called this thesis “ontological relativity”, the label by which the thesis is known today.

Ontological relativity did not begin with Heisenberg much less Quine. Copernicus and Galileo practiced it when they both interpreted heliocentrism realistically and accepted its ontology to the fateful chagrin of Pope Urban VIII. Heisenberg’s Copenhagen interpretation still prevails in physics today. But should future superior test designs and experiments result in falsification of his Copenhagen interpretation and in the survival of, say, David Bohm’s alternative subquantum hypothesis, then physicists’ practice of ontological relativity would make the subquantum hypothesis the prevailing ontology in future microphysics.

In view of the above background description of the contemporary pragmatist philosophy of language, a few of the more salient aspects of the pragmatist concepts of the four functional topics are summarized as follows:

Aim of science:

For the contemporary pragmatists the aim of basic science is explanation. Wherever possible the explanation should enable prediction and ideally control by applied science including new engineering technologies, medical therapies and social policies.

Discovery:

Contemporary pragmatism is consistent with computerized discovery systems, which aim to proceduralize and mechanize new theory development, in order to advance contemporary science.

Contemporary pragmatists define theory language and observation language pragmatically. Theories are universally quantified statements that are proposed for empirical testing. Scientific laws are former theories that have been tested with nonfalsifying test outcomes. Test-design statements are universally quantified statements that are presumed for empirical testing in order to identify the subject for empirical testing and to execute the test. Observation language is particularly quantified test-design and test-outcome statements with their semantics defined in the test-design language. Unlike positivists, pragmatists do not recognize any natural observation semantics.

Contemporary pragmatists individuate theories semantically. Two theory expressions are different theories either if the expressions have different test designs so they identify different subjects, or if the expressions make contrary claims about the subject defined by the same test design.

Criticism:

Contemporary pragmatists recognize the empirical criterion as the only valid decision criterion that yields scientific progress.

Thus on the pragmatist philosophy a priori semantics and ontologies can never trump the empirical criterion for criticism. Ontologies are only accepted a posteriori based upon empirical adequacy as demonstrated by empirical test outcomes.

Thus contrary to romantics, pragmatists permit description of subjective mental states in social science theories and explanations, but never require it as a criterion for criticism.

Pragmatists recognize the nontruth-functional hypothetical-conditional form of statement expressing proposed theories, and they recognize the modus tollens falsifying argument for empirical testing of the theories. Unlike the logical positivists pragmatists do not recognize truth-functional conditional logic in science.

Explanation:

Pragmatists recognize the hypothetical-conditional form of statement expressing scientific laws and the modus ponens nontruth-functional deductive logic for explaining individual events.

Laws are explained in the sense that a set of related laws form a deductive system partitioned into dichotomous subsets of explaining antecedent axioms and explained consequent theorems.
 

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